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len one lists the issues that confront national health policymakers in Europe, few can be classified in simple black versus white terms. On the contrary: policy options in the health sector are customarily defined in subtle shades of grey. Policy proposals typically can be analysed in terms of their likely advantages, dieir potential disadvantages, tiieir implications for other sub-sectors of die system, and, inevitably, tiieir perverse consequences. Lessons learned in one country may or may not be applicable in odier countries, depending on a considerable range of structural variables: history, culture, health system organization and political system. Policy debates resound widi carefully couched versions of that classic academic statement: 'on the one hand, but on the odier hand ...'. What is, therefore, so striking about die notion of adopting medical savings accounts (MSAs) in European health care systems is die single consistent conclusion diat emerges from all die available evidence. Far from producing a range of grey interpretations about likely outcomes, witii MSAs die policy implications are starkly etched in black and white. Every dimension of analysis indicates diat MSAs are not a feasible policy option for developed countries diat wish to maintain an economically efficient or socially responsible health care system. MSAs were originally developed in Singapore, funded by a mandatory deposit of 28% of salary from all employees. The fact rliat MSAs emerged from a developing country widi an audioritarian regime should alone be sufficient to give pause to European policymakers. When one remembers riiat for 50 years die standard international transmission belt for healdi policy ideas has been from developed countries (like die UK and Sweden) to developing countries, one wonders why it is rjiat, in die 1 The MSA strategy in die US is based on a deceptively simple premise: let each individual purchase his/her own healdi care services witii die funds currently used to purchase diird party coverage. 2 A small portion of these funds could then be used by diis individual to purchase a so-called catastrophic insurance policy, which would cover all expenses beyond, say, $4,000 annually per family. (In die United States, private insurance coverage for a family of four costs upward of $5,000 per year.) Any funds left in die MSA account at die end of die year could be withdrawn by the account holder as personal income. As Republican proponents explain it, this MSA model facilitates diree important policy objectives. First, by creating positive financial incentives for individuals to seek less care, MSAs will reduce demand for services. Second, since individuals can keep unspent funds, patients will have strong incentives to shop around for less expensive providers. Third (and, ostensibly, not inconsistently widi die second part), since patients control the funds for payment, they are guaranteed the right to choose providers that meet high quality standards. A moment's reflection, however, indicates diat die core operating mechanisms of this ostensibly new model are themselves far from new. MSAs seek to achieve the three above-described objectives by returning to a provider payment system based on two old healdi sector standbys: fee-for-service and large individual co-payments. MSAs Editorial debate withdraw most of an individual's insurance premium from the broader pool based on collective risk-sharing, and transform it into a fund for 100% co-payments. The incentive to economise is tied to die ability of the individual -as in all co-payments -to keep for personal use whatever funds are not paid out to providers. Since these two operating mechanisms are not new, one can find considerable evidence about the outcomes they have generated in the past. Specifically, one can readily review the past and probable future impact of fee-forservice and large co-payments on die clinical, economic, and social outcomes of existing European healthcare systems. Clinically, fee-for-service discourages individuals from regularly utilising a primary care provider, instead encouraging uncoordinated services from a variety of specialists. It relies upon die anecdotal ability of each patient to process medical information and dien to judge the quality of services received. In addition, co-payments discourage individuals from seeking preventive services, since diey are not immediately necessary."* Conversely, co-payments encourage individuals to self-diagnosis, which leads to distorted patterns of care-seeking emphasising self-limiting conditions diat prevent one from going to work. Economically, fee-for-service is die most expensive way to pay providers, since it generates strong incentives for bodi over-utilisation of expensive specialist services and for over-treatment by those specialists. Higher long-term overall costs are associated with co-payments, since diey discourage the use of cost-effective preventive services. 4 Regarding MSAs specifically, one study concluded diat, in Singapore itself, MSAs did not reduce healdi sector expenditures by any appreciable amount. Socially, fee-for-service based on 100% co-payment has traditionally excluded poorer individuals from receiving necessary services since diey lack sufficient funds to pay for care. With MSAs, if poorer individuals are given sufficient funds to purchase healdi services (for example, from taxes), they face a similar trade-off. They may well choose not to seek necessary curative or (especially) preventive services in order to keep unspent funds for odier, more immediate necessities. MSAs would dius encourage lower utilisation despite die well-known reality that poorer individuals typically need more healdi services dian do dieir economically better off counterparts. Moreover, diis self-payment arrangement would seriously damage social solidarity in die healdi sector. By separating out each individual or families' healdi care funds, MSAs drive a stake into die heart of each of die four cross-subsidies that form a socially responsible payment structure: from rich to poor, from healdiy to sick, from young to old, and from single individuals to families. Instead, MSAs are rooted in die possessive individualist 8 notion diat 'fairness' is achieved only when each separate individual receives back from die insurance system exactly what he or she paid into it. Hence, die ability of each individual to 'wididraw' whatever portion of his/her healdi care premium diat goes unspent on his or her personal medical services. This understanding of'fairness' as personal repayment also forms die conceptual core of several government sponsored but self-funded pension systems in die United States (known as IRAs, or Individual Retirement Accounts, as well as 401 (k) and 403(b) employer-sponsored funds), all of which have been designed to privatise pensions based on individual income and investments. Obviously, diis individually-based understanding of'fairness' is exactly opposite to die concept of cross-subsidy diat underscores European social insurance and tax-based healdi funding systems. It is even antithetical to die basic concept of risk-sharing among groups of individuals inherent in the very notion of insurance itself. From a US perspective, MSAs represent precisely die opposite strategy from managed care. Whereas managed care trumpets die advantages of co-ordinated services, corporate quality management, and an emphasis upon primary care gatekeepers radier dian specialist care, MSAs promote sporadic and erratic individual decisionmaking about die medical services a patient receives. Whereas managed care pursues efficiency dirough economies of scale tied to a complex welter of negotiated contracts and capitated payments, MSAs pursue efficiency dirough the presumed skill of die individual patient negotiating one-off payment agreements widi healdi care providers, based on die notion of consumer sovereignty. Whereas managed care subjects individual physicians to strict utilisation and quality audits, MSAs are viewed by some conservative physicians in die US as a way to escape external review and to return to die autonomous private practice. One cannot help but notice die intellectual confusion in die fact diat, in die United States, many of die same conservative politicians and neo-classical economists who supported managed competition are now championing die oppositely configured MSAs. After a decade of preaching about die anticipated efficiency of a corporate profit-making model for healdi insurance, diese groups now argue diat die true padi to economic efficiency in healdi care is to repeal almost all collective insurance and to revert to a pure market of individual buyers and sellers. It also is worth noting diat die concept of MSAs follows what available evidence indicates is die least effective padi to successful, sustainable healdi care reform. MSAs (like managed competition) seek to generate reform on die funding or demand side of the healdi care system. Yet experience in Europe accumulated over ten years of healdi sector reform strongly suggests diat reforms most likely to achieve dieir objective have taken place on die production or supply side of die healdi system.
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-11 This point has recently been acknowledged by several healdi economists in North America. 12 ' 13 It should further be noted diat one ostensible concern of MSA proponents -to preserve patient choice of provider -can be readily achieved widiout instituting eidier a corporate for-profit version of managed care or fee-forservice-based MSAs. In die solidaristically financed social-insurance healdi systems like diose found in Germany 11 * and The Netherlands,able to choose any service provider. In some tax-funded health systems such as Sweden,' 6 patients also can choose both their primary care provider and their hospital. Thus, it is not necessary to jettison social responsibility for the primitive market arrangements that MSAs would reintroduce to the health sector. MSAs have been fiercely fought in the United States because, even there, the damage that they will do to the remaining social and fiscal fabric of its health care system is painfully apparent. When one weighs up the havoc that MSAs would cause to the clinical, economic, and social character of existing European health care systems, that is, in developed countries which already have universal health care funding in place, MSAs could well be the single worst health policy proposal in many years. It is an idea whose time in Europe should never come.
